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Abstract—Existing smartcards developed for point-ofsale payments are being considered for use in Internet
transactions. Such use provides an alternative to designing new smartcard solutions supporting protocols more
specifically designed for Internet payments, such as SET
([9]). In this paper, we analyze EMV’96 [7], a representative example of an existing payment smartcard specification. We investigate the security of possible Internet
payment systems based on EMV, and suggest modifications that can enhance the security of an Internet payment scheme based on EMV.

II.

MODEL AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR
SMARTCARD INTERNET PAYMENTS

Our model of a generic Internet payment system (Figure 1)
consists of a customer and a merchant exchanging money for
goods or receipts as well as of at least one financial institution
linking electronic payments to the transfer of “real money”
[1].

Financial Network

I.

INTRODUCTION

With the growth of electronic commerce, much effort has
been put into developing secure Internet payment systems and
protocols. A prominent example is SET (Secure Electronic
Transaction, [9]). The original SET specifications do not
target smartcard support, and SET implementations typically
restrict the user to making payments from a dedicated
personal computer. The lack of portability of Internet-specific
systems such as SET has caused the payment industry to
explore the use of existing debit and credit payment smartcards for Internet payments. A standard in this area is the
EMV’96 Specification [7], which describes the functionality
required by such smartcard-based payment systems.
This paper discusses security issues related to using EMV
cards for debit and credit Internet payments. In Section II, we
formulate security requirements for general smartcard-based
debit and credit payments over the Internet. After summarizing the EMV’96 security mechanisms in Section III, we
analyze in Section IV the security properties of using EMV
‘as is’ for Internet payments, by checking the resulting protocols against the formulated requirements. As the Internet
scenario differs from the scenario assumed by EMV’96, these
protocols show a number of vulnerabilities. In Section V, we
propose mechanisms to increase the security of using EMV in
the Internet scenario. Section VI, finally, discusses related
work.

Issuing Bank

Acquiring Bank

Internet
Customer

Merchant

Ban
Fig. 1. Internet payment model.

Customer and merchant communicate over an open network (the Internet) with each other and with their banks
(issuing bank and acquiring bank, respectively).
During a transaction, actual connectivity may be limited to
subsets of players. In a typical online purchase scenario, the
customer has a connection only to the merchant, and communicates indirectly with his issuing bank (e.g., through an
authorization message sent to the merchant and forwarded by
the merchant to the acquiring and issuing banks). The communication model, however, does not influence the security
requirements R1 to R8 stated below.
Before formulating these security requirements, we need to
make a number of assumptions about trust relations and
liability distributions between the parties involved:

A1. Issuer and acquirer enjoy some degree of mutual trust
and share an infrastructure for secure communication.
This allows us to describe only one set of “bank”
requirements.

∗ This work was done while at the IBM Zurich Research Laboratory, Rüschlikon, Switzerland.
This paper is an updated version of [12].

‘Bank’
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A2. Contracts between banks, customer and merchant ensure
that money transfers between accounts are traceable.
This gives user and merchant some assurance of refund
in case of fraud by hackers or bank insiders.
A3. A contract determines the business, trust, responsibility,
and liability relationships between the merchant and the
bank. It especially defines valid payments by specifying
the requirements to be fulfilled so as to provide the
merchant with a payment guarantee.
A4. A contract determines the business, trust, responsibility,
and liability relationships between the customer and the
issuing bank. It defines what the bank considers proofs
of payment by the customer, and specifies the requirements for liability and disputability.
A5. The customer (user) can trust critical parts of his or her
system to enable secure authorization of a transaction. If
the user’s payment instrument is a smartcard authorizing
payment on the user’s behalf, the user interacts with the
card reader (or electronic wallet) by verifying output
(e.g., transaction amount, merchant ID) on its display,
and by entering data (e.g., PIN code) on a keyboard or
PIN pad. The user can trust that
• the correct transaction data are being displayed;
• secret data such as a PIN code entered by the user is
not exposed or intercepted.
A5, admittedly, is very difficult to realize. Without this
assumption, however, secure user authorization can never be
achieved. Its inclusion as an assumption enables us to reason
about protocol requirements needed for secure authorization.
We should keep in mind, however, that without the trusted
card readers needed to realize A5, no smartcard-based payment system can claim non-repudiable or fully secure user
authorization.
We now list the requirements on a payment protocol in the
above model. Requirements R1 to R7 apply to electronic
payment protocols in general. Requirement R8 is related to
controlling access to the customer’s payment instrument, and
is treated with a special focus on the use of smartcards.
A number of requirements deal with proof of authorization
of the transaction by an authorizing party to a verifying party.
This is achieved by an authorization message containing a
non-forgeable cryptographic proof of authentication by the
authorizing party of critical transaction-related data,
satisfying the following properties:

•
•

The verifying party can verify authenticity and integrity
of the critical data in the authorization message, and that
the data originated from the authorizing party;
The message cannot be used to authorize another
transaction (non-replayable); nor can it be used in any
other way to falsely authorize another transaction on
behalf of the customer. The latter applies to schemes in
which secret authorization data (e.g., a PIN) is sent to the
bank. In such cases, this requirement translates into the

requirement that this data be confidentiality-protected
(encrypted) during transfer from card to bank.
Furthermore, as in [2] and [3], we distinguish between
weak and undeniable proofs of authorization. A weak proof
(such as a shared-key-based EMV Application Cryptogram,
Sect. III.C) cannot serve as a proof for third parties whereas
an undeniable proof (based on a digital signature) provides
nonrepudiation and therefore can be used in case of a dispute.
Based on these notions we formulate the following security
requirements for a payment protocol:

R1. Authorization customer to bank. The bank possesses
a payment authorization from the customer before debiting the customer’s account.
R2. Authorization merchant to bank. The bank only
authorizes a payment to a merchant if the corresponding
transaction has been authorized by that merchant.
R3. Payment guarantee for merchant. This is achieved by
either
i. authorization of the transaction by the bank, or
ii. authorization of the transaction by the customer,
where the bank guarantees customer-approved
transactions (see assumption A3).
R4. Authentication and certification of merchant to
customer. The customer has authenticated and certified
critical information about the merchant.
R5. Payment receipt for customer. After completion of
the payment, the customer possesses a proof that the
payment was successful. This can either be
i. an explicit payment receipt from the merchant or
ii. a payment receipt from the bank.
It is sometimes assumed that a receipt can be replaced
by a statement of account [2,3].
R6. Atomicity. No party benefits from an interrupted protocol run.
R7. Privacy, anonymity. The customer may require privacy
of order and payment information and possibly anonymity (from eavesdroppers and possibly from merchants
and/or banks).
R8. Cardholder authorization. The customer’s payment
system is protected against unauthorized use. In the
case of smartcard payments, unauthorized use of the
card is prevented (e.g., through use of a PIN).
The above requirements are illustrated in Section IV, where
we discuss vulnerabilities that result if some of the requirements are not met.

III. SECURITY MECHANISMS PROVIDED BY EMV
This section gives an overview of the EMV’96 mechanisms for securing transaction flows. Mechanisms such as
card and terminal risk management are not discussed here.
For a detailed description of security mechanisms provided
by EMV’96 we refer the reader to [7].
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Fig. 2. The EMV POS (Point-Of-Sale) scenario.

Figure 2 shows the general EMV POS scenario of an IC
(Integrated Circuit) terminal interacting with an IC card, with
the human user presenting the card, and with the bank. (The
actual EMV functionality for authorizing transactions resides
with the issuing bank. Here we do not distinguish between
the issuing bank and the merchant’s acquiring bank.)

•
•

Terminal-card interaction consists of EMV commands
issued by the terminal and card responses.
Interaction between terminal and bank consists of the
exchange of authorization requests and responses, often
over a telephone connection.

Interaction between terminal and human user consists of
output to the user via the terminal display, and input by
the user authorizing the transaction (such as a PIN-code).

EMV uses both asymmetric (public-key) and symmetric
(shared-key) security mechanisms. The full set of security
mechanisms, as shown in Figure 3, is taken from a
transaction flow example in [7]. We do not discuss options
and variants but focus on the maximum security features
achievable in an EMV-compliant transaction.
A. Public-key-based Authentication of IC Card to IC
Terminal
The first four messages exchanged implement Dynamic
Data Authentication (DDA) of the card to the terminal using
a public-key-based challenge-response protocol. The
READ_RECORD command returns the necessary Certification (CA) identifier and public-key certificates needed by the
terminal to authenticate the card’s public key in CERT_C.
CERT_C is certified by the issuer and can be verified using
the issuer’s public key in CERT_I. CERT_I, in its turn, is
certified using the CA’s public key known to the terminal.
The INTERNAL_AUTHENTICATE command triggers the
actual card authentication; the card responds with a signature
over the authentication-related data (ARD).

IC Card

IC Terminal

Bank

READ_RECORD
CA, CERT_I, CERT_C, PAN, …
INTERNAL_AUTHENTICATE (ARD)
SIGN_C(ARD)
VERIFY(PIN Data)
RESULT(OK,FAIL)
GENERATE_AC (RCP, TD)
ARQC = MAC_k(TD)
Online case
ARQC
IAD, [Script]
GENERATE_AC (IAD,TD,[Script])
TC = MAC_k([IAD],TD)
ARD (Authentication Related Data) = date, time, CardID, PAN, TermID, nonce1
k = shared (session) key shared by card and issuer, derived from shared master key
TD (Transaction Data) = amount, currency, date, time1, PAN, TermID, TSC, nonce2
IAD (Issuer Authentication Data) = MAC_k(ARQC, IssuerID, time2), time2
PAN = Private Account Number; RCP = Reference Control Parameter (including off/online preference)
CERT_I = Issuer Public Key Certificate (Certified by CA)
CERT_C = IC card Public Key Certificate (Certified by I)

Fig. 3. Model EMV transaction flows.
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For cards without digital signature capability, EMV also
provides the Static Data Authentication mechanism using
static card data signed by the Issuer.

IC Card

Merchant
EMV

EMV

B. Cardholder Verification
EMV supports online (PIN is sent to and verified by the
bank) and offline (PIN is verified by the card) PIN verification; the exact method supported by the card is returned
in the READ_RECORD response. Offline PIN verification is executed by the terminal issuing the VERIFY command containing the PIN data entered by the user; the
card’s response indicates success or failure. The response
is not cryptographically authenticated.
C. Shared-key-based Application Cryptograms and off- or
online Processing
The GENERATE_AC command, including Transaction
Data (TD), triggers the card to produce a cryptogram that
can be verified by the issuer. If both card and terminal
agree on completing the transaction offline (based on their
risk management policies) the card returns a TC (Transaction Certificate) approving the transaction. If either card
or terminal want to continue online, the card produces an
ARQC (Authorization Request Cryptogram), which the
terminal passes on to the bank in an online authorization
request. If verification is successful, the bank returns an
authorization response message containing Issuer Authentication Data (IAD) and possibly a command script to be
delivered to the card. The terminal then issues the second
GENERATE_AC command including the IAD and the
command script.
ARQC, TC and IAD are authenticated using MACs
(Message Authentication Codes). These are generated by
64-bit block ciphers using a session key k derived from a
master key shared by the card and the issuer. The issuer
can verify both ARQC and TC; in the online case the card
verifies the IAD in the second GENERATE_AC command and thereby authenticates the issuer’s response. The
terminal triggers the generation and verification of these
cryptograms but cannot verify them.

IV. EMV PAYMENTS IN THE INTERNET SCENARIO
In the remainder of this paper, we analyze if and how
EMV cards can be used for secure Internet payments.
The scenario in Figure 4 shows a customer using an
EMV card for online purchases from a personal computer
equipped with a card acceptance device (reader). The
merchant still acts as the EMV terminal, issuing and
receiving EMV commands and responses, but communicates with customer and bank over the Internet.

Bank

Internet

Fig. 4. The EMV Internet scenario.

PIN verification deserves some special attention. While
in the POS scenario the terminal secures the transaction by
making sure the PIN is verified correctly, PIN verification
in an Internet setting should no longer be controlled by the
merchant.
1.

2.

Online PIN verification now requires the PIN to be
sent from card to merchant to bank over insecure
connections. Even when encrypting (e.g., using SSL
[5]) communication, the PIN appears in clear in the
merchant’s software, which is too high an exposure.
Even offline PIN verification (using VERIFY) can no
longer be controlled by the merchant. Firstly,
requiring VERIFY (including the PIN) to be issued
by the merchant assumes that the PIN first be sent to
the merchant over an Internet connection (and thus
unnecessarily expose it). Secondly, the result of
VERIFY is not authenticated. Thus, when received
over the Internet, there is no guarantee for the merchant that this result was produced by the card.

Thus, for the Internet scenario, we recommend (and
assume in the following discussion) that

•
•
•

only the offline PIN authentication mechanism
(VERIFY by the card) be used;
the VERIFY command be issued locally (at the cardholder terminal), and
the card application itself enforce cardholder verification by issuing ARQC/TC only after a successful
VERIFY (this is currently not an explicit condition in
the EMV specifications).

We now map the online and offline transaction flows of
Figure 3 to the Internet setting of Figure 4, resulting in two
EMV Internet scenarios (with and without online authentication) as shown in Figure 5. In the following paragraph
we analyze their security by checking them against the
requirements in Section II. Unless otherwise mentioned,
the discussion of a requirement is valid for both scenarios.
Table 1 summarizes the results.
1.

Authorization customer to bank. The transaction is
weakly authorized by shared-key-based cryptograms
(ARQC or TC).
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C u s to m e r

M e rc h a n t

Bank

REA D _R ECO R D
C A , C E R T _ I, C E R T _ C , P A N , …
IN T E R N A L _ A U T H E N T IC A T E (A R D )
S IG N _ C (A R D )
G E N E R A T E _ A C (T D )
L o c a l P in
V e rific a tio n

O n lin e auth o rization
A R Q C = M A C _ k (T D )
ARQC, TD
IA D
G E N E R A T E _ A C (IA D , T D )

T C = M A C _ k ([IA D ], T D )

Fig. 5. EMV Internet scenarios with and without online authorization.

2.
3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

Authorization merchant to bank. The merchant does
not explicitly authorize the transaction.
Payment guarantee for merchant. The merchant
receives no authorization of the transaction by either
the bank or by the customer because the merchant
cannot verify any of TC, ARQC, or IAD.
Authentication and certification of merchant to
customer. EMV provides no mechanisms to authenticate the terminal and certify the merchant.
Payment receipt for customer. In the scenario without
online authorization, the customer receives no proof
of payment. In the other scenario, one might consider
the IAD as a payment receipt (see A3 and A4). This,
again, assumes that the bank’s response completes the
payment and that the merchant can consider the
ARQC together with the IAD as a guarantee for
payment. This is unlikely because the merchant can
verify neither ARQC nor IAD.
Atomicity of payments. Atomicity is provided, based
on assumption A2 that money transfers between
accounts are traceable.
Privacy, anonymity are not supported: EMV does not
encrypt transaction data (such as customer identification) on the card-to-terminal channel. Privacy and
anonymity will not be further discussed.
Cardholder authorization. Based on assumption A5,
this is achieved when using card-enforced PIN verification as recommended above (see also Figure 5).

The summary in Table 1 shows a majority of unsatisfied
requirements (N) without distinction between scenarios.
This is a result of the EMV specifications being developed
for the POS scenario, in which the terminal is under some

control by the merchant (and/or bank), the merchant can
verify the physical presence of the card, and merchant and
bank communicate over secure connections. A more detailed analysis of the POS assumptions and their influence
on the EMV design can be found in [12].
Before discussing mechanisms that increase the security
of EMV-Internet scenarios, we illustrate some threats
resulting from the “N”s in the table.
A. No Payment Guarantee for the Merchant
This is the most serious problem: without a payment
guarantee the merchant may lose money when delivering
goods that are not paid for afterwards.

•

•

No bank-to-merchant authorization: As the merchant
cannot verify the bank’s authorization response
(IAD), an attacker could impersonate the bank to the
merchant with an invalid IAD, convincing the merchant that the transaction was successful; alternatively, valid transaction data or a valid IAD can be
modified during the transaction without the merchant
becoming aware of it, or the bank might repudiate the
authorization afterwards.
No customer-to-merchant authorization: This is especially critical in the offline case because the merchant
has to accept a payment without being able to verify
the TC. Anyone can make a payment on the cardholder’s
behalf
(although
Dynamic
Data
Authentication would at least require the fraudster to
have the card) or the cardholder can repudiate a
payment he or she actually made. Even if a valid TC
was issued by the card, it can be modified on the way
to the merchant.
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TABLE 1.
SECURITY ANALYSIS EMV INTERNET SCENARIOS WITH AND WITHOUT ONLINE AUTHORIZATION
(Y = REQUIREMENT SATISFIED; N= REQUIREMENT NOT SATISFIED)

Part I: GENERAL
BANK
1. authorization customer to bank
2. authorization merchant to bank
MERCHANT
3. payment guarantee for merchant
• authorization bank to merchant
• authorization customer to merchant
CUSTOMER
4. merchant authentication + certification
5. payment receipt for customer
from the merchant
from the bank


Online authorization

Without online authorization

Y (weak)
N

Y (weak)
N

N
N

N
N

N

N

N
N

N
N

Y
N

Y
N

Y (card-enforced VERIFY)

Y (card-enforced VERIFY)

ALL PARTIES
6. atomicity of payments
7. privacy, anonymity
Part II: SMARTCARD-SPECIFIC
8. cardholder authorization
B. No Merchant Authorization

V.

An attacker may impersonate a real merchant to both
customer and bank, and conduct a successful transaction
on behalf of the real merchant, who might not even be
aware of it, or a dishonest customer may intercept and
modify the transaction data on the merchant-to-bank channel. In the former scenario, the customer does not receive
the goods ordered and has to claim a refund, while in the
latter the merchant does not receive the expected payment
for goods possibly delivered.

Let us now discuss various mechanisms that can add
security to the above scenarios. We first analyze the merits
of using a transport-layer mechanism such as SSL ([5]) to
secure the communication channels used, a solution that
imposes no changes on the EMV infrastructure. Given the
limited improvements using this approach achieves, we
then recommend some modifications to the EMV infrastructure.

C. No Merchant-to-customer Authentication/Certification

A. Securing Communication Channels

For debit or credit payments the damage for the customer caused by lack of merchant authentication is limited:
the customer can only lose money to a legitimate merchant. The absence of a merchant-to-customer (M-C)
authentication mostly reinforces the danger posed by the
absence of a merchant-to-bank (M-B) authorization in the
sense that a fully complete, normal and legitimate payment to M can take place without M being involved in any
stage of the EMV protocol.

SSL can provide authentication of communicating
parties, and integrity and/or confidentiality of the ensuing
dialogue. If the parties involved adequately secure their
systems, this provides protection against outsider attacks.
However, as will be discussed in the following paragraphs,
SSL cannot protect against dishonest insiders.
SSL secures a data stream rather than authenticating
individual messages. This data stream could carry data
generated by applications other than EMV, and is secured
using a shared temporary session key that is meaningful
only to both communicating parties. Thus, SSL ‘authenticated’ messages or data streams can never have any
authenticating value to a third party. The authorizing value
they have to the receiving party during the connection
depends entirely on the receiver’s trust in the sender’s
system and honesty. Thus, SSL may add a weak authoriza-

D. No Receipt for the Customer
This is critical mainly if the customer buys goods at
rapidly changing conditions (such as shares). It can cause
a loss of goods, opportunities, or money for the customer
if the merchant denies certain conditions.

MECHANISMS TO ADD SECURITY WHEN USING
EMV OVER THE INTERNET
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tion value to EMV messages exchanged between a bank
and a merchant who trust each other; the same can
probably not be said about messages exchanged between
customer and merchant.
SSL, then, can add some protection from outsider
attacks, but does not provide the authorization of EMV
messages necessary to protect against dishonest insiders
(or honest insiders using insecure systems). In the next
subsections, we suggest two modifications to EMV that
help solve these problems.
B. Signed Authorization Response
In the online authorization scenario, the (issuing) bank
could sign the authorization response with its private
signature key:
SIGN_I (Y/N, Transaction Data, IAD)
The merchant can verify this signature and now has an
undeniable payment guarantee, which solves the main
vulnerabilities shown in Sect. IV.A. The merchant can
also detect modifications of Transaction Data (TD), which
weakens the threats incurred by a missing authorization of
the merchant to the bank (see Sect. IV.B).
If the same issuer key is used for signing the authorization response as for certifying cards, this extension is very
straightforward to implement, because the certificate
CERT_I is already present on the card. However, re-using
this issuer certification key to sign transaction messages
considerably increases its exposure. This is critical
because the public key is stored on many cards and
therefore difficult to replace if compromised.
Using a different issuer public key (and certificate) is
quite costly because it either has to be stored on the card
or sent by the issuer to the merchant as part of the
authorization response. An alternative solution, combining
security and low overhead, consists of the acquirer (as
opposed to the issuer) signing the authorization response.
As the merchant has a long-term relationship with the
acquirer, it can be assumed that the acquirer’s public key
is stored permanently by the merchant.
C. Transaction Certificate (TC)
The Transaction Certificate TC could be signed with the
card’s private key:
TC = SIGN_C (TD, [IAD] )
A public-key-based TC is verifiable by the merchant and
can be considered a payment guarantee (Sect. IV.A),
depending on the contract terms between merchant and
acquirer. Also, the merchant can detect a modification of
transaction data, precluding some of the threats related to
a missing merchant-to-bank authorization (Sect. IV.B).
A signed TC seems to be a natural extension to EMV,
given that DDA-capable cards already have signature
capability. However, to support this extension, message

formats for cryptogram generation need to be changed,
which may have a major impact on the entire EMV infrastructure. Despite these necessary changes, we recommend this extension because without it, it is difficult to
provide security in the absence of online authorization.
D. Merchant Authentication
The changes proposed in Sects. V.B (online authorization only) or V.C (especially important in the absence of
online authorization) can greatly improve the security of
the corresponding EMV-Internet scenarios. The remaining
vulnerabilities are primarily related to the lack of authentication and authorization of the merchant to both customer
and bank. Closing these holes in a rigorous way by providing merchant authentication in EMV largely impacts
the EMV infrastructure, which currently does not allow
for secret keys to be stored in merchant terminals. However, the keys stored need not be system-wide symmetric
keys but rather the merchant’s own private signature key
for authentication to bank and/or customer. Therefore such
a modification can only improve overall security. It first of
all allows the merchant to sign the authorization request
message, providing secure authorization by the requesting
merchant. It also allows merchants to authenticate to the
card and to deliver a signed payment receipt for the
customer that, without online authorization, is the only
means for the customer to receive a receipt (other than an
after-the-fact account statement). Alternatively, signature
verification could be done in the trusted card reader (or,
possibly, in the PC software).

VI. RELATED WORK
The principle of using existing payment smartcards to
secure Internet transactions was applied in pilot projects
such as e-COMM [4] and C-SET [6] in France. Both integrate shared-key-based Transaction Certificates from
existing EMV-like banking cards within SET or SET-like
protocols.
In line with these pioneering efforts, recent enhancements to the EMV’96 and SET specifications allow
integration of the two payment systems. In the following,
we discuss these enhancements, and relate them to the
analysis made in this paper.
The EMV'96 Chip Electronic Commerce Specification
[8] describes how to integrate key EMV applications, such
as online card authentication and cardholder verification,
into SET. According to [8], SET provides confidentiality,
integrity, interoperability, and merchant authentication,
while EMV provides card authentication and cardholder
verification. This is done by including EMV cryptograms,
and possibly EMV PINs, into the SET payment messages.
The SET extensions necessary to accommodate this inte-
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gration are described in the SET Common Chip extension
[10] and SET Online PIN Extensions [11].
Rather than proposing a specific solution, we have tried
to give a comprehensive and systematic overview of the
security features and limits of a variety of related solutions. Similarly, the EMV and SET extensions mentioned
above describe not just one but a large set of possible
combined EMV-SET solutions, depending on the EMV
smartcard application and the version of SET used. As
such, we cannot analyze the EMV and SET extensions
against the security requirements in this paper. We hope,
however, that the analysis and examples provided in this
paper can help design specific solutions based on the EMV
and SET specifications.

VII. CONCLUSION
The use of EMV ‘as is’ over the Internet has major (and
unacceptable) security shortcomings. Securing the communication channels between the different parties (customer, merchant, bank) using secure communication protocols can prevent mainly outsider attacks. However it
does not solve the inherent lack of authentication in the
EMV protocol. Therefore we propose a number of EMV
extensions that can increase security in the Internet setting.
The most challenging is the EMV scenario without
online authorization, where only the use of a public-keybased Transaction Certificate provides appropriate
security to the merchant.
Online EMV authorization in an Internet setting, though
currently insecure because of merchant as well as bank
impersonation attacks, can be made more secure by
digitally signing authorization requests and responses.
Lack of initial authentication and certification of the
merchant to the customer is a vulnerability that can only
be solved by extending the EMV infrastructure with
terminal-to-card (or, alternatively, terminal-to-reader or
terminal-to-user’s PC) dynamic authentication. In the
absence of terminal authentication, software-based
mechanisms (e.g. SSL server-to-client authentication) can
be put in place to limit the risk of outsider attacks.
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